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The paper provides an axiological analysis of the concepts of respect for
information and of information dignity from the vantage point provided by
Information Ethics and the conceptual paradigm of object-oriented analysis
(OOA). The general perspective adopted is that of an ontocentric approach to the
philosophy of information ethics, according to which the latter is an expansion of
environmental ethics towards a less biologically biased concept of a ‘centre of
ethical worth’. The paper attempts to answer the following question: what is the
lowest possible common set of attributes which characterises something as
intrinsically valuable and an object of respect, and without which something would
rightly be considered intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy and
therefore rightly disrespectable in itself? The thesis developed and defended in the
paper is that the minimal condition of possibility of an object’s least intrinsic
worthiness can be identified with its abstract nature as an information entity. Thus,
all entities, interpreted as clusters of information, have a minimal moral worth qua
information objects (i.e. qua information), that deserves to be respected. The
principles elaborated in the course of the analysis are those of ‘reflective respect’
(A’s respect towards all members of A’s class motivated by A’s respect towards A
not qua individual, but qua instantiation of a class of entities), ‘ontic uniformity’
(A’s recognition of A’s membership to the class of information entities) and ‘ontic
solidarity’ (A’s recognition of any information entity’s dignity).
Keywords:
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Ends, Kingdom of Nature, moral value, object-oriented analysis, respect
1. INTRODUCTION: AN OBJECT-ORIENTED MODEL OF MORAL
ACTION
According to an information ethics (IE) approach, moral phenomena or facts1 c n
be structured as information systems arising out of the dynamic interaction of
seven principal components. Since in this paper I wish to analyse a fundamental
feature of just one specific component, namely the intrinsic moral value of the
patient, in what follows I shall sketch only a general model by way of introduction.
   To construct a moral fact or phenomenon, we may start by implementing a
simplified model of a moral action. Any action, whether morally loaded or not, has
the logical structure of a process that relates a set of one or more active sources
(depending on whether we are working within a multi-agent context), the agent A,
with a set of one or more destinations, the patient P. To clarify the nature of A and
P we can borrow the concept of information ‘object’ from the object-oriented
analysis paradigm (OOA).2 A and in case P (see below for the case in which P may
be a process) can be discrete, self-contained, encapsulated3 p ckages containing:
• The appropriate data structures, which constitute the nature of the entity in
question (state of the object, its unique identity, and attributes).
• A collection of operations, functions or procedures (methods4), which are
activated (invoked) by various interactions or stimuli, namely messages
received from other objects (message passing) or changes within itself, and
correspondingly define (implement) how the object behaves or reacts to them.5
   In Leibnizian and more metaphysical terms, an object can be treated as a
sufficiently permanent (a continuant) information monad, a description of the
ultimate primal component of all beings. The moral action itself can be constructed
as an information process, i.e. a series of messages (M), generated and activated by
A, that brings about a transformation of states directly affecting P, which may
variously respond to M with changes and/or other messages, depending on how M
is interpreted by P’s methods.
   A, P and M are the first three information components of our system.6 The fourth
component is represented by the personal or subjective frame of information within
which the agent operates. This shell,7 which is really an integral part of A’s nature
but which it is useful to treat separately, is the information frame that encapsulates
the subjective infosphere (see below). It is constituted by internally dynamic and
interactive records (modules) of the agent’s moral values, prejudices, past patterns
of behaviour, attitudes, likes and dislikes, phobias, moral beliefs acquired via
education, past ethical evaluations, memories of moral experiences (e.g. of similar
situations in which he acted as a witness) or of other moral actions performed in
the past, expectations, and so forth. In short, it represents the ethical and epistemic
conceptualising interface between the agent and the environment. It is not the task
of this paper to specify in detail the very complex and dynamic nature of this
subjective information frame. Suffice to say that the agent’s shell, although it
works as a crystallisation of aspects of the agent’s life, is constantly evolving
through time, may contain shared or imported elements from other agent’s shells,
may be only partly accessible to the agent himself and only partly under the control
of his will, and yet it contributes substantially to the shaping of his behaviour by
screening him from the direct impact of the information environment, filtering and
regulating his access to, and hence highlighting and interpreting the relevant
aspects of, the factual information concerning the specific moral situation in space
and time in which A is involved. This factual information represents the fifth
dynamic component of the system and is perhaps the only element in our model
that all ethical theories are ready to recognise as playing an instrumental role in any
moral action. An action with a potential moral value can be treated as actually
moral or immoral only insofar as its source A is, among other things, conscious (A
is aware of his actions), sufficiently free (A is rationally autonomous in the Kantian
sense, and can intentionally bring about, stop or modify the course of action in
question, depending on the situation), reasonable (A is intelligent in Mill’s sense,
i.e. has some capacity to forecast the consequences of his actions) and factually
informed. Without some factual information about the moral situation in question
(factual information is sufficient; although one may speak of knowledge,
understood as a combination of factual information and understanding, this would
be too great a requirement) no ethical evaluation is possible on the basis of the
agent’s intentional responsibility. In other words, an intentional action is morally
right or wrong, and it is possible to evaluate it as such and hence to assess the
responsibility of its source, only if the latter is free and sufficiently informed (any
moral action and corresponding evaluation can take place in a state of only relative
scarcity of information) and, vice versa, there is no morality in a state of total
determinism and/or ignorance (cf. animal behaviour).8 Note that, as a corollary, it
follows that some apparent moral dilemmas can be resolved by showing that the
action in question no longer qualifies as being subject to an ethical evaluation,
either because there is not sufficient information or because there is not sufficient
freedom in the system (most importantly, if an agent is forced to commit a morally
wrong action, his last resort is to refuse to exist as an agent and commit suicide; if
even this option is beyond the agent’s power—as one may imagine in some version
of the case of Jim and the 20 Indians, for example9—then the agent becomes a
mere instrument in the hands of his torturer and his moral responsibility vanishes.
Of course, the existential problem remains of how the agent can make sense of his
violently ‘instrumental’ treatment, his ‘moral death’ as it were).
   It remains to introduce the last two information components. The agent does or
does not implement, and hence variously controls and adjusts, his autonomous and
informed behaviour in a dynamic interaction with the general environment in
which he is located (e.g. a given culture, society, historical epoch, family situation,
financial status, group of individuals, working conditions, etc.). In another
context,10 I have described this constantly evolving universe as the infosphere, the
environment constituted by the whole network of information objects—including
all agents and patients, messages, their attributes and mutual relations. The specific
region of the infosphere in space and time, within which the moral action takes
place, namely the moral situation, represents the last component of the system.
Borrowing a term from robotics, we may define this information microworld as the
envelope of the moral action.11
   Now that all seven components have been introduced, three comments are in
order. Firstly, when the message is a reflective process or a process that also has a
feedback effect, A may be identical with, or treated as, one of the P. I shall come
back to this point in a moment. Secondly, it is hardly ever the case that a message
affects only a discrete set of well-specified patients P. In what follows, it will be
convenient to limit our attention to a simplified dynamic model, and this is why I
have used the word  ‘directly’ above, but we also need to keep constantly in mind
that a message functions like an information vector or wave, with a given direction
and force, not as a binary switch. Once the message has been released, its direct
and indirect effects almost immediately cease to be under the control of its source
A, while their life always extends in time and space, in the form of a gradually
decreasing continuum. Using another OOA concept, we can then speak of the
‘propagation’ of an operation, which starts at some initial object and flows from
object to object through association links in the system and according to possibly
specifiable rules. During the propagation, the vector may change both in direction
and in force. Clearly, a message affects not just the immediate target of the process
but also the envelope (hence the agent himself, his shell and the factual
information) and finally the whole infosphere (think of an abused child who, as an
adult, becomes an abuser), which may all be treated as patients. This introduces a
third comment on another significant feature of our model: there is no difficulty in
always treating A as an object, and in the following analysis of intrinsic worthiness
it is also appropriate always to treat P as an object, but we shall see that a negative
axiology (a theory of intrinsic unworthiness) requires a more adequate conception
of what kind of entity may count as a patient, which may also include a message.






Figure 1. An IE-OO model of moral action: static structure (class) diagram.
A class diagram is a graphic description of the static structure of a model: it describes its 
components (especially classes), their internal structures and their mutual relatioships.




freedom = > 0 and < or = 1
rationality = > 0 and < or = 1
informed state = > 0 and < or = 
1
power = > 0 and < or = 1
















































freedom = limited (< 1)
rationality = imperfect (< 1)
informed state = imperfect (<1)
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Individual Person : Human Being
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Moral Agent : Complex IE
Choice : Complex IE
Information Process : Complex IE
Shell : Inforegion
Moral Patient : Information Element (IE)
Inforegion I : Inforegion
V : ValuesEX : Experiences
Decision : Complex IE
Factual Information
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Figure 2. An IE-OO model of moral action: dynamic interaction (collaboration) diagram.
A collaboration diagram is a graphic description of the functinal and dynamic interactions within a model: it 
describes it interaction relations, organised around the components of the system. The sequence of 






















































2. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN ETHICS
We are now in a position to refine our general question, concerning the value and
importance of information in the study of moral facts, by investigating more
precisely and accurately the specific value and importance that each of the seven
components may have within the information system, depending on its role and
contribution to the moral action. For example, it would be interesting to develop a
detailed typology of the various envelopes (decision problems, moral choices,
cases of unintentional disregard or lack of attention, evaluation of third-party
actions, control and guide of on-going processes, etc.) within which a course of
action with a moral value may develop and, on this ground, to build an
information-based theory of moral vagueness (casuistry and the presence of moral
latitude in human actions). Likewise, we may investigate whether a moral process
has a canonical architecture. What interests us here, however, is a more crucial
problem for the foundation of IE. Even a cursory analysis is sufficient to make it
clear that, if all components in the system can have only an instrumental value in
connection with the moral action, that is, if the set {1, …, 7} can accurately be
described, on the whole, as providing only the (typology of) information input
required by any moral action, then IE may, at most, play only an ancillary role with
respect to other Macroethics (theoretical, field-independent, applicable ethics such
as Deontologism or Consequentialism). This is because the latter attempt to
establish not just the necessary and sufficient conditions of adequacy for the
occurrence of a moral action, e.g. its information input, but, more importantly,
what ought to be the very nature of the action in question, why a certain action
would be morally right or wrong, what ought to be done in a given moral situation,
and what the duties, the ‘oughts’ and ‘ought nots’, the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of a moral
agent may be. Thus, the crucial problem for the foundation of IE is that either
information itself, in some form or role, can be recognised to have some moral
standing—that is an intrinsic moral value over and above its recognised
instrumental function, which ought to contribute to determining, normatively, the
agent’s moral behaviour and hence also have a role in the analysis of legally
enforceable rights and ethical duties—or any IE can be at most a Microethics (a
practical, field-dependent, applied or professional ethics).
3. AN AXIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION
I have already argued elsewhere12 in favour of the macroethical nature of IE and
hence the intrinsic moral value of information. The thesis can be briefly restated
here by analysing the seven components already mentioned. It seems clear that 3,
4, 5, 6 and 7 have an immediately instrumental value in connection with the moral
action to be performed by the agent. However, the status of the agent and the
patient, and the possible modifications in the nature of both, brought about by the
information process, cannot be reduced to a mere instrumental factor. These are
axiological elements that clearly play a decisive role in the normative assessment
of a moral phenomenon, and this is the point on which we now need to
concentrate.
   At this stage of our analysis, we can already restrict our concern to the fate of P.
It would be pointless to pursue two paths, one concerning the agent and the other
the patient of the ethical process, because:
• As we shall see in a moment, what we need to consider is whether an
information entity in its most general format—not insofar as it is a specific
being, e.g. a human being—can have an intrinsic value that ought to regulate a
moral action affecting it. Since any object that can act as a moral A can also
qualify as a moral P but not vice versa (e.g. animals can be moral P but not
moral A) it is better to concentrate on the information nature of an object as a
possible P rather than as a possible A.
• As I remarked above, whenever the action in question is found to be either
reflexive (e.g. suicide, where A = P) or retroactive (e.g. moral vices acquired
through the repetition of actions which are not in themselves necessarily to be
deprecated from a moral point of view) the model allows us to extend to A any
observation we shall make about P.
   By discussing in the most universal and abstract terms the moral worth of an
object as a P, not only can we extend our observations to any object insofar as it
may also behave as an A, but we can also extrapolate from the specific nature and
position taken up in a given envelope by a component of the system, and hence
generalise our conclusions so as to include any possible information element that
may in principle be affected by the behaviour of a moral agent, and hence qualify
as a patient of a moral process, thus including other envelopes, the infosphere itself
and the methods, the latter in a way which will become fully clear once we have
also developed a negative axiology.
   Is there any unconditional (i.e. neither instrumental nor emotional) and intrinsic
worthiness, in the nature of an entity that may work as an interpretation of P, that
may play a significant role in determining, constraining, guiding or shaping A’s
moral actions? That is, does an object as a P have a dignity that ought to contribute
to the moral configuration of A’s message? In so far as a patient object has some
dignity, it contributes to the configuration of the message by morally demanding
(we shall analyse later what is implied in this ‘communication’, see K2 below) that
A recognises such dignity in a special intentional way, i.e. by having respect for it.
A’s respect for P’s dignity consists both in the appreciation of P’s specific
worthiness and in the corresponding, uncoerced disposition to treat P appropriately,
according to this acknowledged worthiness. Obviously, only objects capable of
intentional states can have respect for P’s intrinsic value and hence act as moral
agents, but are they also the only entities that can have an intrinsic value?
3.1. A Critique of Kantian Axiology
According to a typically Kantian axiology,13 there are only two ways in which an
entity x may have a value:
• Either x can rightly function only as a means to an end other than itself, and
therefore it has an instrumental or emotional value (economic value);
• or x necessarily qualifies also as an end in itself, and therefore it has an
intrinsic, moral value qua x.
   Kant argues that anything can have an instrumental value for the sake of
something else, but that only human beings as rationally autonomous agents can
also have an intrinsic value, and hence dignity, for only rationally autonomous
agents understood as ‘good wills’ can be the source of moral goodness, thanks to
their rational and free actions. This Kantian dichotomy, intrinsic vs. instrumental
worthiness:
K1 Justifies the coextension of (i) the class of entities which have dignity, (ii) the
class of entities capable of moral respect, and (iii) the class of entities that
deserve to be morally respected. In Kant, the only type of entity that has
dignity is the same type of entity that may correctly qualify as a moral patient
and that may in principle act as a moral agent.
K2 Solves the communication problem between A and P: thanks to K1 the agent is
acquainted with the dignity of the patient, and hence can respect it, because
both entities belong to the same type of class, Kant’s ‘Kingdom of Ends’.14 We
shall see that, since IE rejects K1, it needs to find a more developed solution to
the communication problem than K2.
K3 Implies that an entity’s dignity is a kind of unconditional and incomparable
worthiness: either x has an instrumental value, subject to degrees,
economically significant but morally irrelevant, or x has an unconditional and
intrinsic value, which is morally relevant but absolute and cannot rightly be
subject to economic assessment.
The Kantian dichotomy turns out to be  controversial. Not only does K3 clash with
some of our basic intuitions, but K1 fails to take into account two important
distinctions.
   We commonly assume that different entities may have different degrees of
relative worthiness (dogs, for example, may be credited with a lower moral dignity
than human beings) that ought at least to constrain the agent’s methods, without
necessarily having an instrumental worthiness—i.e. a value relative to our feelings,
impulses or inclinations, as Kant would phrase it—that may orient them. Likewise,
we intuitively accept the view that life, biological organisms or the absence of pain
in sentient beings can all have a great deal of moral value and deserve a
corresponding amount of respect. Many would agree, for example, that a human
being who is even inherently (i.e. not just contingently, e.g. because of unlucky
circumstances that may change) incapable of any intentional, rational and free
behaviour still has dignity, no matter how humble, that deserves to be respected,
although not for instrumental or emotional reasons. More generally, we commonly
assume that only rational beings are capable of respect but, contrary to what Kant
suggests in K1, we do not treat ‘having an absolute dignity’, ‘being capable of
respect’ and ‘being intrinsically respectable’ as symmetric properties. Rational
beings are capable of various degrees of respect, to which there seem to correspond
various degrees of dignity, and although Kant is right in arguing that ‘good wills’
definitely deserve more respect than other entities, because they are the conditions
of possibility of what is morally good, most people would maintain that they only
constitute a subclass of the entities that may have a morally significant claim on the
agent, as entities subject to some respect.
   These intuitions are prima facie reasonable, and challenge the Kantian
dichotomy.  The fundamental problem in Kant’s axiology may well have its roots
in his ontology, which does not admit of a degree concept of existence, and hence
of moral worth, on epistemological grounds (cf. Kant’s rejection of the ontological
proof and his binary concept of existence), and in the corresponding, conceptual
framework represented by the ethical dichotomy between autonomy and
heteronomy. The latter seems to lead Kant unduly to restrict the sense of ‘relative
worth’ to meaning only ‘contingent worth depending on the agent’s interest’,15 so
that if x can be rightly and appropriately used only as a means, then x has no
absolute worth (and this follows), has only a relative worth (and this also follows),
but this can only mean that x’s worth has no moral nature whatsoever, because x’s
worth is now to be interpreted as depending only on the instrumental or emotional
interest of the agent, which is a clear non sequitur, if we drop the conceptual
identity introduced before. The result of the Kantian analysis is that not only do the
Kingdom of Ends and the Kingdom of Nature remain largely separate and
independent, but the former becomes an information-closed system that is allowed
to rule over the latter16 without there being even the theoretical possibility of the
latter providing some indication or constraints.
3.2. An Object-Oriented Approach to Axiology
In order to improve Kant’s anthropocentric axiology17 for our present purposes, it
is useful to introduce two distinctions. Let us agree with Kant that there are
different ways and degrees in which an entity may have some instrumental
worthiness. When the worthiness in question is neither instrumental, nor just
emotionally attached to it by a human subject,18 we can first distinguish between
extrinsic and intrinsic value and, correspondingly, between two types of respect.
An entity x has extrinsic value when it is respected as y; for example, a piece of
cloth may be respected as a flag, a person may be respected as a police officer, or a
practice may be respected as a cult. This sense of relative respect is associated with
a sense of worthiness which is no longer instrumental or emotional and may be
called semantic. Semantic worthiness is still utterly contingent, may be acquired or
lost, can be increased as well as reduced. In brief, it is wholly extrinsic. The entity
x (e.g. a police officer) may stop being y (e.g. he retires) and hence lose the right to
be extrinsically respected (the same person is no longer respected as a police
officer), while still remaining essentially the same entity (the specific person in
question). In order to capture in full the fact that x has dignity in itself, which
belongs to x in all circumstances (necessarily), not under certain conditions, and is
not subject to modification unless x ceases to exist, we need to consider the case in
which x deserves to be respected not just semantically, as something else, but qua
x. It is here that we need to depart from the Kantian analysis more radically and
introduce a second distinction.
   The dignity of an entity is based on its ontology, i.e. what the entity in question is
determines what kind of moral worthiness it enjoys, if any, whether and how it
deserves to be respected and hence what kind of moral claims it can have on the
agent. Since Kant adopts a kind of Aristotelian ontology, for him the intrinsic value
of x is indissolubly linked with its essential nature as a certain type of entity. Thus,
for Kant an individual, say Lisa, has dignity not as a specific person, but only
insofar as she is a token of the general type ‘free and rational human being’, a
member of the ‘Kingdom of Ends’, in Kantian terminology. In respecting Lisa, the
agent is not primarily or directly respecting the specific, unique and contingent
individual qua herself, but rather the universal type she instantiates.19 Therefore,
the Kantian analysis does not distinguish between two separate senses in which the
essential nature of x determines its dignity qua x. These two senses can best be
clarified by relying on our OOA concepts. The specific nature or essence of an
object (whether this is a type or token does not matter now) consists in certain
attributes which the object x could not have lacked from the start except by never
having come into being as object x, and cannot lose except by ceasing to exist as
object x. This essence is a factually indissoluble, yet logically distinguishable
combination of (at least some of) its local and inherited attributes. For example, if
O2 = Person = descendant object, and O1 = Living Organism = ancestor object, we
may say that ‘freedom’ is an essential and local attribute of Person (i.e. a new
property, not previously implemented in any of the ancestor objects), while
‘sentient animal’ is an essential attribute inherited by Person from its ancestor
object Living Organism. Let us assume now that the object O has an intrinsic
value. It is correct to say, with Kant, that O’s intrinsic value depends on its
essence, but it is also important to specify that this essence, and the corresponding
intrinsic value, are both aggregates, i.e. they are the result of a specific
combination of local and inherited essential attributes.
   For example, let us suppose that we respect the object called ‘Lisa’ because of
her local attribute ‘free agent’, which is part of her essence. Her essence also
includes that of being a ‘living organism capable of feelings of pain and pleasure’.
Let us refer to the former as Lisa’s F attribute and to the latter as Lisa’s L attribute,
and let us also simplify matters by saying that Lisa inherits L from her ancestor
object called ‘Animal’. Suppose now that Lisa is radically and definitely deprived
of her local attribute F—that is, let us imagine that she becomes inh rently (see
above) incapable of any free and intentional behaviour, e.g. because she is brain-
dead—what would be the Kantian position with respect to her dignity? The
alternatives seem to be only four. None of them is fully satisfactory.
   An extremist solution would be to ‘bite the bullet’ and argue that
A. Lisa lacks the necessary attribute F, so she can have no justified claim to moral
respect. Citizenship to the Kingdom of Ends is a necessary and sufficient
condition but it can be lost and, without it, there are no moral rights.
Of course, (A) is logically acceptable, but its unpleasant consequences inevitably
clash with some of our most elementary moral intuitions. According to (A), for
example, we could freely dispose of Lisa’s organs without being faced by any
moral problem.
   If we wish to maintain that, despite the lack of F, Lisa still deserves to be
respected, as most people think she should be, we may try to argue, still with Kant,
that
B. Lisa still posses a type-dignity, as an entity that somehow still enjoys the local
attribute F, because in principle, though not in practice, she still is a member
of the class ‘free agents’.
(B) tries to rationalise the prima facie justified request that Lisa may still posses
some dignity, and hence deserve to be respected, by working on a rather
problematic interpretation—as something ‘absent-yet-still-present’—of the set of
properties necessary to qualify as a rational being. The trouble with (B) is that it
becomes soon unclear what it means to have ‘in principle’ a certain type of
attribute, unless by this we wish to refer either to
B.1. a logical possibility, or to
B.2. the object’s potentiality.
the actual possibility being out of the question by hypothesis.
   If (B.1) is the case, then the criterion (respect any x of which it would be a
contradiction to say that it could not qualify as a ‘free agent’) becomes too vague,
because it is also logically possible that a dog may behave as a free agent.
   If (B.2) is the case—as one may argue on the basis of the previous reference to
Kant’s Aristotelian ontology—then, by saying that Lisa may still have the attribute
F potentially, we may mean that
a. although now brain-dead, Lisa is still morally respectable because she is
potentially free by nature, and this is the case because she is a human being.
This ‘potentially free’ feature of her nature cannot be taken away merely
because some factor (malformation, accident, disease, drugs, etc.) is, in point
of fact, preventing her from ‘actualising’ that potential; the potential can exist
unactualised and yet consist of more than mere logical possibility, as her lost
freedom is something she could have in a way a dog never could.
(a) would allow our Kantian philosopher to solve the axiological problem, if it
were not for the fact that, as it stands, it is confronted by two substantial problems.
   First, (a) begs the question. In constructing the counterexample, we have not
assumed that Lisa happens to lack the attribute F momentarily or just accidentally,
e.g. because she is under the temporary effect of a drug. If this were the case, (a)
would be correct, but there would be no interesting challenge for the Kantian
axiology any way. Rather, we have assumed that Lisa has been ess tially or
inherently deprived of her attribute F: she is not and will never be capable of any
free behaviour, for example because she is irreversibly brain-dead. The
unsatisfactory reply to this first problem, given in (a), is that Lisa’s essential F
attribute cannot be taken away by a contingent event, e.g. a car accident. This is
simply false (second problem). Although essential by hypothesis, a potential
attribute is not a necessarily permanent feature of an object and, contrary to what
(a) states, there is no problem in assuming that it may be removed, not even within
an Aristotelian ontology (see above the definition of what counts as the essence of
an object). This is intrinsic in the conceptual nature of the potentiality/actuality
distinction, which was originally developed to provide an explanation of change
and transformation. A potentiality is an individual’s capacity to acquire a certain
new state, and this capacity can disappear either temporarily or definitely, if the
attribute becomes actual, or definitely, if the conditions of possibility of the
actualisation of the potential attribute are irreversibly removed, as this is the case in
our example. If the potentiality of being x is a necessary attribute to qualify as y,
this does not mean that whatever is y cannot lose the attribute x, but only that, if y
loses x, then y becomes something else different from y. To illustrate the point
with a more Aristotelian example: a healthy man has the potentiality of becoming a
marathoneter, but once he has become one, this means that he has changed into
something else and has lost the potentiality of becoming a marathoneter in favour
of the actuality of such potentiality; likewise, if he loses his legs, he no longer
enjoys the potentiality of becoming a marathoneter. In some cases, when the
potential attribute belongs to the essence of the object, its removal implies the re-
categorisation of the individual in a different class, but this is precisely the problem
facing us at the moment: whether a brain-dead person, who may not count any
longer as an ordinary human being, may still be entitled to some moral respect
even if the only entities entitled to moral respect are rational beings.
   (a) does not provide a satisfactory answer, but it does contain a valuable point.
We have seen that it is not true that, if the attribute F is practically unactualisable,
F is therefore utterly lost and regainable only as a logical possibility. Yet this is not
the issue addressed by our counterexample, in which the attribute F becomes
essentially unactualisable. What must be conceded to (a), however, is that there
still is a difference between saying that a dog c uld be free and that Lisa, who is
brain-damaged, as a human being had the potentiality of being free. The difference
would be blurred by a mere reference to a logical possibility, but can be captured
by a counterfactual analysis, which leads us to reformulate (a) thus:
b. to say that Lisa is potentially free is to say that, under normal circumstances,
Lisa would have not been deprived of F and so she would have been morally
respectable.
(b) provides a position, with respect to Lisa’s possibility of having F, that is
qualitatively (naturalness) and quantitatively (probability) stronger than (B.1). This
is obvious if we try to replace ‘Lisa’ with ‘dog’ in (b). (b) is also more stringent
than (A), but is it sufficiently strong to solve the axiological problem? The answer
is still in the negative. (b) can at most support a ‘counterfactual respect’, which is
still too weak for the purpose of solving the axiological issue raised by our
counterexample: had Lisa had the attribute F (had circumstances been different)
she would have been the object of moral respect. This is all one can argue on the
ground of (b). Since Lisa does lack the attribute F, however, the counterfactual
analysis leaves us with the possibility of being fully justified in showing no moral
respect for her. We are not denying that, in many possible worlds, she would have
deserved some respect, we are stating that, in the present actual world, she is not
‘eligible’.
   A Kantian axiology fails to accommodate our counterexample satisfactorily
because it is unable to clarify, in a convincing way, why Lisa should be morally
respected only on the ground of what, in our counterexample, she actually lacks
irreversibly. This discloses a general problem affecting the Kantian approach: for
Kant, a person is morally respectable only in an indirect sense. When Kant speaks
of moral respect he has in mind primarily perfectly rational agents and only
derivatively human beings seen as fallen creatures. In his ‘top-down’ deontological
ethics, a person is respectable only insofar as she or he implements the properties
necessary and sufficient to qualify as a rational being. If the person in question
does satisfy such conditions, this hides the fact that, in respecting her, one is really
asked to respect a class to which the individual person does not have to belong
necessarily. If the person does not satisfy such conditions, it becomes immediately
clear that the reason why she was being respected was only that she was partaking
of the ‘holy’ properties of the class of rational beings.
   A completely different alternative would be to argue that Lisa still has an object-
dignity as an entity that enjoys the inherited attribute L. We may no longer express
towards Lisa exactly the same respect we would have towards a free agent, but we
would still feel forced to respect her at least as a living organism capable of
feelings. This bottom-up alternative looks for the minimal, not the maximal
conditions of moral worthiness, appears more reasonable and in line with our
common sense, and is the one favoured by IE.
   Once the distinction between local and inherited attributes is introduced, asking
what the intrinsic value of O qua O is means to ask three different questions.
1. What is the intrinsic value of O qua this specific object constituted by this
specific aggregate of local and inherited attributes?
A full answer to (1) can be provided only by combining the two senses in
which O has an intrinsic value according to (2) and (3) below. A theory that
concentrates only on (1) is a theory of individual dignity, i.e. of the intrinsic
value that O possesses in itself as a specific individual, not just as an
instantiation of a type, as in a Kantian axiology. Note that O may be either a
single entity (Lisa) or a whole class (Women), so the theory can be either
nominalist or universalist.
2. What is the intrinsic value of O qua an object constituted by its local
attributes?
Since Kant’s concepts of essence, type-token and class membership cut across
our concepts of inheritance20 and aggregate of local and inherited attributes,
none of the three questions is exactly the question addressed by Kant, yet (2) is
probably the one that comes closest to the Kantian approach, where the local
attributes are interpreted as the essential properties of the class of all human
beings. A theory that concentrates on (2) may develop a maximalist axiology
(Kantism), according to which there is only a restricted selection of local
attributes, e.g. intentionality, self-determination, and rationality, that qualify an
object as having dignity. We have seen that Kant is right in arguing that this
special object, defined as a ‘rational being’ or ‘good will’, is the one that has
the highest dignity and hence deserves absolute respect. However, we have
also remarked that Kant may be wrong in assuming that this is the only sense
in which it is possible to speak of moral worthiness and respect. The search for
an alternative approach, more in line with our basic intuitions, brings us to the
third question:
3. What is the intrinsic value of O qua an object constituted by its inherited
attributes?
An axiology that concentrates on (3) can be pluralist or minimalist. A pluralist
axiology indicates in a selection of inherited attributes—such as intelligence,
feelings, biological life or life tout court—the ontological source of the
intrinsic worthiness of an entity, and therefore assigns to a wide variety of
objects, namely all those that inherit one or more such attributes, some dignity
and hence a corresponding claim to A’s respect. Of course, the dignity in
question cannot be absolute, since the theory accepts more than one inherited
attribute as comparable, when not competing. It is likely, however, that there
may develop a hierarchy of inherited attributes and of priorities in moral
standing, and hence a minimalist theory.
   A minimalist axiology (which does not necessarily have to be monist, quite the
contrary, but that is not pluralist in the sense that it does not admit that there may
be more than one, incomparable, minimal degree of worthiness) accepts only one
set of inherited attributes as the minimal condition of possibility of intrinsic
worthiness and, as a result, assigns to all the objects that inherit these attributes a
corresponding, minimal degree of absolute dignity, in the following sense. Here
‘absolute’ still means not relative, as in the Kantian ‘question’; but while in (2) or
more generally in Kant’s axiology, the intrinsic value of an entity is incomparable
because it is unique in the sense that there are no other types of dignity, and hence,
a fortiori, it can not be increased or overridden on the basis of considerations
involving other levels or degrees of dignity, here the minimal intrinsic worthiness
of an entity is incomparable because it is unique in the sense that it can be reduced
no further, it is necessarily shared, universally, by all objects that may have any
intrinsic value at all, and it deserves to be respected by default, although it can still
be overridden in view of considerations involving other levels or degrees of
dignity. Objects are more or less morally respectable, and we shall see in a moment
that a message too is less respectable the more entropy it generates. To clarify this
with a simplified example: if one agrees that potential human life has a lower
dignity than actual human life, respect for the former can be overridden by respect
for the latter when discussing the moral status of contraception.
4. IE’S MINIMALIST AXIOLOGY
Clearly, to the question ‘What entities have absolute dignity and hence deserve
respect?’ two types of answers are now possible, one maximalist or Kantian, and
the other minimalist, depending on what we mean by ‘absolute dignity’.
Minimalist theories of intrinsic worthiness have tried to identify in various ways
the inherited attributes, i.e. the absolutely minimal condition of possibility of the
lowest possible degree of intrinsic worthiness, without which an entity becomes
intrinsically worthless, and hence deserves no moral respect. Investigations have
led researchers to move from more restricted to more flexible, anthropocentric
criteria and then further on towards biocentric criteria. As the last stage in this
dialectical development, IE maintains that even biocentric analyses of the inherited
attributes are still morally biased and too restricted in scope: as Computer Ethics
and Deep Ecology convincingly argue, inanimate objects too can have their
intrinsic value, and indeed even ideal or intellectual objects seem to have a
minimal degree of dignity, no matter how humble, and so are entitled to some
respect. If they can be P, then they ought to be taken into respectful consideration
by A and contribute to formatting A’s messages, no matter how minimally. It
follows that the minimal criterion for qualifying as an object that may rightly claim
some degree of respect must be lower than any biocentric reference to the object’s
attributes as a living entity. What, then, is the lowest possible common set of
attributes which characterises something as intrinsically valuable and an object of
respect, and without which something would rightly be considered intrinsically
worthless (not just instrumentally useless or emotionally insignificant) or even
positively unworthy and therefore rightly disrespectable in itself? The least biased
and most fundamental solution is to identify the minimal condition of possibility of
an object’s least intrinsic worthiness with its abstract nature as an information
entity.
   The very information nature of an object, that may in principle act as a patient of
a moral action, is the lowest threshold of inherited attributes that constitutes its
minimal intrinsic worthiness, which in turn deserves to be respected by the agent.
Or, to put it more concisely, being an information entity qua information entity is
the minimal condition of possibility of moral dignity and hence of normative
respect. This is the central axiological thesis of any future Information Ethics that
will emerge as a Macroethics, to use another typical Kantian phrase. The thesis is
controversial, rich in consequences and far from being devoid of difficulties. Here,
I shall indicate only three of its problems and then briefly discuss the two most
urgent.
   According to IE, the least (i.e. not reducible), unconditional (i.e. neither
instrumental nor emotional), intrinsic (i.e. belonging to its inherited essence in the
OOA sense) and absolute (see above) worthiness of any entity, that in principle
may fulfil the role of a patient object P, consists in its nature q a information entity
and in the very fact of being a possible patient of A’s message. On the one hand,
the effect of the latter aspect of P’s minimal dignity (the effect of its role as patient)
is completely exhausted in inducing A’s respect. On the other hand, understanding
in detail  how the dignity of P, as an information entity, can contribute to the
configuration of A’s message requires an information ontology (a theory of the
intrinsic attributes of information, such as integrity understood as unimpaired and
uncorrupted unity and persistence21 across time) exactly in the same sense in which
other minimalist axiologies, that privilege the human or biological nature of P as
the ground of P’s worthiness, are based on specific anthropological, psychological,
physiological or biological theories. Unfortunately, there is no space to develop
here even a sketch of an information ontology. Now that we have established that
the minimal dignity of any patient consists in its information nature, we need to
concentrate on two more immediate and urgent problems: the communication
problem and the problem of evil.
4.1. The Communication Problem
We saw in K2 that, when there is no asymmetry between A and P, in principle the
agent should encounter no conceptual difficulties in recognising the patient’s
dignity, and hence in behaving respectfully. Both entities belong to the same class,
share the same essential nature and hence the same kind of absolute dignity, and
the process of communication between P’s essence, P’s dignity, A’s respect for P’s
dignity and M’s adequacy to both A’s respect and P’s dignity is granted by a
principle of reflective respect whereby the agent can recognise in the patient an
alter-ego, a member of the same ontological community, and thus easily extend to
P all the considerations of moral worthiness and requirements of adequate respect
that he would expect to be rightly applied to himself. This reflective respect is at
the root of the Golden rule: A can adequately regulate his actions towards P in a
way which is already morally successful even if he limits himself to considering,
perhaps empathically, how he would like to be treated if he were in P’s position.
   The principle of reflective respect cannot easily be exported when there is an
asymmetry in the nature of A and P. Human self-respect and personal interest in
one’s own well-being provide little indication of how to behave when P is an
animal, a tree, a painting, a grain of sand, someone’s diary, a mathematical theory,
a social custom, a corpse, a way of greeting and so forth, all ‘elements’ whose
minimal dignity lies in their information status. What seems to be required, on A’s
side, is a rather more complex and less natural attitude than an empathic effort. A
should transcend his own specific nature, recognise his minimal status as an
information object himself and hence extend the respect, that he would expect any
other agent to pay to himself as an information element, to any other information
element that may be the patient of his actions. The former principle of ontic
uniformity grants that the agent acknowledges his own membership of the
infosphere and so recognises the inherited attributes he shares with all other
information components of the infosphere as the ontological ground of their
common minimal dignity. The latter principle of ontic solidarity grants that the
agent will treat all elements of the infosphere, including himself, as having at least
a minimal dignity qua information. The moral attitude promoted by IE that
emerges from the two principles can be defined, with a play on words, as an
‘object-oriented’ attitude.
4.2. The Problem of Evil: IE’s Negative Axiology
An axiology that accorded some positive degree of intrinsic worthiness and hence
of moral respectability to literally anything would be of very little value in itself,
for in so doing it would clearly fail to make sense of a whole sphere of moral facts,
and the commonly acknowledged presence of worthless and unworthy patients.
Thus, it would provide ultimate evidence of its own unreasonableness and
unacceptability, not unlike a theory of knowledge that could provide no room for
the possibility of human error, or a theory of scientific experiment that made
falsification inconceivable. If IE hopes to be treated as a Macroethics, it needs to
provide a negative axiology as well.
   Let us first introduce some conceptual clarifications. There seems to be no
specific verb in English that conveys exactly and only the opposite of ‘respect’ in
full, so let us treat ‘irrespect’ as simply meaning ‘lack of both respect and
disrespect’. By ‘disrespect’ and its cognate words we can then refer to the morally
justified and active form of ‘anti-respect’ towards an unrespectable x, which
consists in not causing x, preventing x, removing x, or modifying x so that it is no
longer to be disrespected. If something is intrinsically worthless, then it is simply
irrespectable, and it is morally indifferent whether or not A respects it as a P. If
something is intrinsically unworthy, then it is positively to be disrespected
inasmuch as it has a certain degree of indignity, and not only it is morally wrong if
A shows respect for it as P, but it is morally right if A shows a corresponding
degree of disrespect for it, in the technical sense introduced above.
   What is intrinsically worthless or unworthy, according to IE? Something is
intrinsically worthless, lacks any dignity and cannot be a centre of moral respect if
and only if it does not have even the minimal status of information. The only
meaningful sense in which it is possible to speak of a ‘something’ that fails to
qualify as an information entity is by speaking of an object that is intrinsically
impossible, i.e. a logical contradiction in itself. The temptation of talking in purely
negative terms of a similar object must be resisted, since even the apparent lack of
explicit information qualifies as the presence of some information, whereas a
contradiction posits and erases itself at the same time, thanks to its self-referential
nature. There is an infinite number of inconsistent objects, but since each of them
contains the affirmation and negation of at least one attribute, and since this
inconsistency entails that anything may be predicated of the object in question,
following Leibniz’s law (identity of indiscernibles) it must be concluded that there
is only one object-type that qualifies as intrinsically worthless and irrespectable.
Let us call it C. C represents the zero degree in our scale of dignity, and its
importance can be clarified by an example. Whether one endorses the ontological
argument or not, the following corollary is usually accepted as uncontroversial:
given its attributes, namely a collection of all possible perfections to the highest
degree, the special object called God either exists necessarily or does not exist
necessarily, but cannot exist or fail to exist contingently (either God exists in all
possible worlds or in none, but it makes no sense to say that he exists only in
some). If God exists necessarily, then he also has the highest degree of dignity and
deserves A’s highest degree of respect as P. If God does not exist necessarily, then
he qualifies as a token of C, he is worthless and it is morally indifferent whether or
not A respects him as P. However, it can never be appropriate to say that it is
morally wrong for A to show respect for God, or that it is morally right for A to
show some degree of disrespect for God. This is IE minimalist version of Pascal’s
wager.
   I have argued above in favour of a degree conception of intrinsic worthiness. The
same approach can now be extended to intrinsic unworthiness. Below C, we find
anything that has some possible degree of intrinsic unworthiness and is
correspondingly to be disrespected. We have just seen that objects can at worst be
worthless, never unworthy. Does this mean that the class of unworthy elements is
empty? Obviously not. The whole infosphere is made of objects (with their
relations, shells, methods and attributes) and messages. Messages can also be
patients of A’s actions and, insofar as they have an information nature, we can
apply to them what has been said above about the intrinsic worthiness of objects.
However, while objects can at worst be intrinsically worthless, messages can also
be unworthy and deserve to be disrespected. Messages are not only information
entities in themselves but also processes that affect objects either positively or
negatively. Let us call messages that respect and take adequate care of the welfare
of P ‘positive messages’, and messages that do not respect or take adequate care of
the welfare of P ‘negative messages’. Negative messages are unworthy and hence
to be disrespected inasmuch as they ‘maltreat’ their patients. A message that
‘maltreats’ P is a message that does not respect P’s information nature, i.e. a
message that increases entropy.22 It is never morally right to show respect for a
negative message and A has a duty to be comparatively disrespectful towards an
unworthy message and to try not to cause, but rather prevent or remove entropy.
5. CONCLUSION: SOME CONSEQUENCES OF IE’S AXIOLOGY
We can now consider a number of consequences of IE’s positive and negative
axiology. According to IE, messages, but no objects, can rightly deserve to be
disrespected as intrinsically unworthy (in more metaphysical language: any process
that denies existence, insofar as it denies existence, deserves no respect, but
anything that is, insofar as it is, deserves some respect qua entity). We saw that the
object God is either respectable or irrespectable, but cannot be disrespectable.
Likewise, something evil is either irrespectable or disrespectable, but cannot be
respectable. Ultimate and absolute evil as an object, e.g. the Devil, however, has no
dignity at all, and is simply irrespectable because it is an instance of C, in other
words it is logically impossible, for it would have to be an object without the status
of information (note the analogy here with the negative version of the ontological
argument: the Devil, as the ultimate and absolute hypostatisation of evil nature,
necessarily has all the possible limits and defects to the highest degree, including
the highest degree of non-existence, namely necessary non-existence, and therefore
necessarily does not exist). There can be evil in the infosphere only in terms of
negative messages. These are intrinsically more or less to be disrespected, and
ought not to be caused, but  prevented, removed or modified in such a way as to
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become no longer evil. The degree of disrespect that A ought to show towards a
negative message is proportionate to the degree of its unworthiness.
   In a possible infosphere in which there were no changes whatsoever, there would
be no evil (this is the IE version of the Platonic thesis concerning the goodness of
being). This also clarifies the sense in which something can be extrinsically
disrespected: an agent that activates a negative and hence unworthy message is
indirectly and contingently deserving of disrespect, but only as a source of M,
hence extrinsically. Peter can be extrinsically deserving of disrespect as the
perpetrator of a horrible crime, but he cannot be intrinsically deserving of
disrespect qua the specific entity he necessarily is. No human being can be a Devil.
   Finally, the extension of the concept of intrinsic worthiness to any information
entity qua information is now paralleled by the extension of the concept of intrinsic
unworthiness to any message qua negative process and source of entropy.
Messages do not need to be intentional to be unworthy and hence deserving of
disrespect, so not every natural process deserves to be respected  for the simple fact
that it is natural (cf. for example the problem of blood transfusion). We live in an
improvable infosphere and intentional, rational and free agents have a duty to
improve it. Their essential capacity to implement positive messages and disrespect
negative ones is precisely what makes them the objects with the highest dignity.
* I am grateful to Richard Keshen, for his thoughtful comments and suggestions on a previous version of
this paper, and to Rondo Keele for his valuable criticism of a previous analysis of the example
discussed in 3.2.
1 I am not assuming here the controversial hypothesis that there may be facts or phenomena that
naturally qualify as being in themselves moral or ethical. By using the expression ‘moral facts or
phenomena’ I only wish to refer to all those facts or phenomena which ordinarily are evaluated as moral
or immoral.
2 I hope to be able to argue in the future that OOA provides a powerful modelling tool (conceptual
analysis and design) of the real world, and should represent an essential component of Information
Ethics methodology in order to describe and understand particular ethical issues within a problem
domain. In what follows, I have adopted the standard terminology and the conceptual apparatus
provided by James Rumbaugh et al. in Object-Oriented Modeling and Design (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1991) whenever possible. Visual modeling provides a graphical representation of the
structure and interrelationships of a system by constructing models of a design. UML (Unified
Modeling Language), a de facto industry-standard language for specifying, visualising, constructing,
and documenting software systems, is the language used in the graphic models in this paper. They have
been developed by means of ROSE (Rational Object Oriented Software Engineering), a de facto
standard visual modeling tool that implements UML. Of course, ROSE has been primarily thought as a
tool to allow developers to define and communicate a software architecture. Thus, given the topic and
the limits of space, I have relied on a more elementary and simplified formalism for expressing object
models. For more information and a free, downloadable, educational copy of ROSE, based on the
Rose/C++ 4.0 version, cf. http://www.rational.com.
3 In OOA, encapsulation or information hiding is the technique of keeping together data structures and
the methods (class-implemented operations) which act on them in such a way that the package’s internal
structure can be accessed only by means of the approved package routines. External aspects of an
object, which are accessible to other objects, are thus separated from the internal implementation details
of the object itself, which remain hidden from other objects.
4 In OOA, a method is a particular implementation of an operation, i.e. an action or transformation that
an object performs or is subject to by a certain class. An operation may be implemented by more than
one method.
5 More technically, an object has an identity, a state and a behaviour, three features which are also partly
defined by the class it belongs to. A class in OOA is a intentional concept, i.e. it is used as a descriptor
or constructor of objects.
6 The reader who finds it difficult to conceptualise the agent, the patient and the process as three
information components may think of the agent as a mathematical model of a robot (whether it is
implemented or not is irrelevant) indistinguishable from a human being, acting in a virtual environment.
Even more intuitively, we may represent the system as a realistic fiction, in which characters behave
more or less morally. Note that the modelling provided presupposes no commitment to any strong AI
thesis.
7 The term comes from the operating system architecture vocabulary, not from OOA. It is the portion of
the operating system that defines the interface between the operating system and its users.
8 Suppose that, through some cruel mechanism, switching on a computer causes enormous suffering in
an innocent person imprisoned in the next room. The suffering is utterly unjustified and pointless. If the
agent were informed about the causal connection, then by switching on the computer the agent would be
committing a morally wrong action. If the agent is not informed, any ethical evaluation appears idle.
9 The reader may have seen Seven (1995), the psychological thriller directed by David Fincher, starring
Morgan Freeman, Brad Pitt, Gwenyth Paltrow and Kevin Spacey. The plot of the film is simple: two
homicide detectives hunt for a serial killer who justifies his horrible crimes as absolution for the world's
ignorance of the Seven Deadly Sins. In the case of the sin of Lust, the serial killer forces a man to kill a
prostitute through a horribly violent sexual act. When the man is in the police station, he recounts and
justifies his action by saying that the killer had kept a gun in his mouth during the whole course of
action. The police officer, who listens to the confession, does not challenge his justification, implicitly
agreeing that, since his own life was seriously at risk, he could not be expected not to torture and kill the
prostitute. Obviously, the philosopher’s reaction is completely different: the man should have asked the
killer to pull the trigger. We are told that he is a married man, we know his life is completely wretched,
and one may even go as far as to say that he appears so shocked by his behaviour, which has left him
with no integrity or dignity, that he may even commit suicide. We know, but he does not, that the killer
would probably not have killed him, since his intention was to kill the prostitute by means of a sexual
act and the man’s death did not fit in the plan. The man turns out to be an instrument in the hands of the
killer, but this is so only because he is unable to make a principled moral choice, and die rather than
commit a horrible crime against an innocent. On the other hand, the killer probably expects him to be
morally weak since he has already found him in a brothel, willing to use a human being simply as a
means, not as an end in herself.
10 Cf. ‘Information Ethics: On the Philosophical Foundation of Computer Ethics’, an invited paper given
at ETHICOMP98 The Fourth International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information Technology,
Erasmus University, The Netherlands, 25 to 27 March 1998, available at
http://www.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/~floridi/ie.htm; and Philosophy and Computing (London: Routledge,
1999).
11 The ‘envelope’ of a robot is the working environment within which it operates or, more precisely, the
volume of space encompassing the maximum designed movements of all the robot’s parts.
12 Cf. ‘Information Ethics: On the Philosophical Foundation of Computer Ethics’.
13 See I. Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. by M. J. Gregor with introduction by A. W. Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), (all references are to this edition). In the Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth Groundwork) Kant writes: ‘[p. 84] In the kingdom of ends
everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its
equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a
dignity.’
14 See for example Groundwork, p. 85.
15 Groundwork, p. 79.
16 Groundwork, p. 73 (‘act as if the maxim of your actions were to become by your will a universal law
of nature’), see also pp. 86-8. On p. 86 Kant writes: ‘all maxims from one’s own lawgiving are to
harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature’, but on p. 88 it seems that only
God as a single sovereign can bring together the kingdom of ends with the kingdom of nature.
17 It is interesting to note that the four examples used by Kant to illustrate the application of the ‘Law of
Nature’ formulation of the imperative (‘act as if the maxim of your actions were to become by your will
a universal law of nature’) in Groundwork, pp. 73-75 are all ‘anthropocentric’ and concern only duties
to oneself or to others, so when Kant speaks of the ‘Formula of Humanity’ version of the imperative in
Groundwork, pp. 80 (‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’), he employs the same 4
anthropocentric examples.
18 This is Kant’s ‘fancy price’, see Groundwork, p. 84.
19 Groundwork, p. 84: ‘Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which
alone has dignity’.
20 In OOA, inheritance is the sharing of attributes and operations among classes based on a ‘is-a-kind-
of’, hierarchical relationship between objects. An object is the ancestor object of another, which inherits
its attributes and methods. An object may have more than one ancestor (multiple inheritance), may
share an ancestor with other objects (shared inheritance) and inheritance may be dynamic (ancestors can
be added, deleted or changed through time).
21 Adapting another OOA concept, persistence can here be defined as the property of any object that
outlives the process that generates it.
22 Non-being is the absence or negation of any information, or entropy. In IE, entropy is a semantic, not
a syntactic concept. As the opposite of information capacity, it indicates the decrease or decay of
information leading to absence of form, pattern, differentiation or content in the infosphere. Broadly
speaking, entropy is a quantity specifying the amount of disorder, degradation or randomness in a
system bearing energy or information. More specifically, in thermodynamics, entropy is a parameter
representing the state of randomness or disorder of a physical system at the atomic, ionic, or molecular
level: the greater the disorder, the higher the entropy. In a closed system undergoing change, entropy is
a measure of the amount of thermal energy unavailable for conversion into mechanical work: the greater
the entropy the smaller the quantity of energy available. Thus, a glass of water with an ice cube in it has
less entropy than the same glass of water after the ice cube has melted. According to the second law of
thermodynamics, during any process the change in entropy of a system and its surroundings is either
zero or positive, so the entropy of the universe as a whole inevitably tends towards a maximum. In
information theory, entropy is a measure of the noise, or random errors, occurring in the transmission of
signals or messages, whereas information is a measure of the probability of a message being selected
from the set of all possible messages. Both concepts are therefore purely syntactic: neither information
nor entropy refer to the actual meaning, content or interpretation of the message (a string of nonsense
symbols and a meaningful sentence may be equivalent with respect to information content), but both
quantitative parameters are based only on the presence of uninterpreted difference. The greater the
information in a message, the lower its randomness, or noisiness, and hence the smaller its entropy. In
IE, we still treat the two concepts of information and entropy as having the same inverse relation, but
we are concerned with their semantic value: for example, as the infosphere becomes increasingly
meaningful and rich in content, the amount of information increases and entropy decreases, or as
entities wear out, entropy increases and the amount of information decreases.
Biography
Luciano Floridi (Laurea, University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, M.Phil. and Ph.D.
Warwicks., M.A. Oxon.) is Research Fellow, Wolfson College, and Lecturer in
Philosophy, Jesus College, University of Oxford. His most recent publications
include various articles on the epistemological aspects of information and
communication technology. He is the author of Scepticism and the Foundation of
Epistemology - A Study in the Metalogical Fallacies (Leiden: Brill, 1996) and
Philosophy and Computing (London: Routledge, 1999). He is the consultant editor
for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy on CD-ROM  and the editor of P.O.
Kristeller's Iter Italicum on CD-ROM.
View publication stats
